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1. Introduction
The debate  over  the role international  trade  plays  in  determining  environmental
outcomes has at times generated more heat than light.  Theoretical work has been successful
in identifying a series of hypotheses linking openness to trade and environmental quality, but
the empirical verification of these hypotheses has seriously lagged.  Foremost among these is
the pollution haven hypothesis that suggests relatively low-income developing countries will
be made dirtier with trade.  Its natural alternative, the simple factor endowment hypothesis,
suggests  that  dirty  capital  intensive  processes  should  relocate  to  the  relatively  capital
abundant developed  countries with  trade.    Empirical  work  by  Grossman  and  Krueger
(1993), Jaffe et al. (1995) and Tobey (1990) cast serious doubt on the strength of the simple
pollution haven hypothesis because they find trade flows are primarily responsive to factor
endowment  considerations  and  apparently  not  responsive  to  differences  in  pollution
abatement costs.  Does this mean that trade has no effect on the environment?   
This paper sets out a theory of how "openness" to international goods markets affects
pollution levels to assess the environmental consequences of international trade. We develop
a  theoretical  model  to  divide  trade's  impact  on  pollution  into  scale,  technique  and
composition effects and then examine this theory using data on sulfur dioxide concentrations
from the Global Environment Monitoring Project. The decomposition of trade's effect into
scale, technique and composition effects has proven useful in other contexts [see Grossman
and Krueger (1993), Copeland and Taylor (1994,1995)] and here we move one step forward
to provide estimates of their magnitude.  We find that international trade creates relatively
small changes in pollution concentrations when  it alters the composition,  and  hence the
pollution intensity, of national output.  Combining this result with our estimates of scale and
technique effects yields a somewhat surprising conclusion: if trade liberalization raises GDP
per person by 1%, then pollution concentrations fall by about 1%.   In the case of sulfur
dioxide concentrations, free trade is good for the environment.  
    We obtain this conclusion by  estimating  a  very  simple model highlighting  the
interaction of factor endowment and income differences in determining the pattern of trade.
Our approach,  while  relatively  straightforward,  is  novel  in  three  respects.    First,  by
exploiting the panel structure of our data set, we are able to distinguish empirically between3
the negative environmental consequences of scalar increases in economic activity - the scale
effect - and the positive environmental consequences of increases in income that  call  for
cleaner production methods - the technique effect. This distinction is important for many
reasons.1 Our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in the scale of economic activity raises
concentrations  by  approximately  .3%,  but  the accompanying  increase  in  income  drives
concentrations down by approximately 1.4% via a technique effect.
Second,  we  devise  a  method  for  isolating  how  trade-induced  changes  in  the
composition of output affects pollution concentrations.  Both the pollution haven hypothesis
and the factor endowment hypothesis predict openness to trade will alter the composition of
national output in a way that depends on a nation’s comparative advantage.  For example in
the pollution haven hypothesis, poor countries get dirtier with trade while rich countries get
cleaner.2  As a result, looking for a consistent relationship between additional pollution and
openness to trade (across a panel of both rich and poor countries) is unlikely to be fruitful.
Instead we look for trade’s composition effect after conditioning on country characteristics.
We find that openness per se, measured in a variety of ways, has very little consistent impact
on pollution concentrations. Openness conditioned on country characteristics has however a
highly significant, but relatively small, impact on pollution concentrations.    
And lastly, our approach forces us to distinguish between the pollution consequences
of income changes brought about by changes in openness from  those  created  by  capital
accumulation or technological progress.  We find that income gains brought about by further
trade or neutral technological progress tend to lower pollution, but income gains brought
about by capital accumulation raise pollution.  The key difference is that capital accumulation
favors the production of pollution intensive goods whereas neutral technological progress
and further trade do not.   One immediate implication of this finding is that the pollution
consequences of  economic  growth  are dependent  on  the underlying source  of  growth.  
Another more speculative implication is that pollution concentrations should at first rise and
                                                
1  For example, income transfers across countries raise national income but not output, whereas foreign
direct investment raises output more than national income.  For these, and many other reasons,  we need
separate estimates of technique and scale effects.
2  That is, the composition effect of trade for poor countries makes them dirtier while the composition
effect for rich countries makes them cleaner.  The full effect of trade may be positive even for poor countries
depending on the strength of the technique and scale effects.4
then fall with increases in income per capita, if capital accumulation becomes a less important
source of growth as development proceeds.  
The theoretical literature on trade and the environment contains many papers where
either income differences or policy  differences  across  countries drive pollution  intensive
industries to the lax regulation or low-income country.  For example, Pethig (1976), Siebert
et al. (1980), and McGuire (1982) all present models where the costs of pollution intensive
goods are lower in the region with no environmental policy.  One criticism of these papers is
that while they are successful in predicting trade patterns in a world where policy is fixed and
unresponsive, their results may be a highly misleading guide to policy in a world where
environmental protection responds endogenously to changing conditions.   Empirical work
by Grossman and Krueger (1993) suggests that it is important to allow policy to change
endogenously with income levels and in  our  earlier  work  (Copeland and  Taylor (1994,
1995)) we incorporated the Grossman-Krueger finding to investigate how income-induced
differences in pollution policy determine trade patterns.  
While this earlier work produced several insights, it was limited because it ignored
the potential role factor abundance could play in determining trade patterns.  In contrast, the
model we develop here allows income differences and factor abundance differences to jointly
determine  trade  patterns.    This  extension  is  important,  especially  in  an  empirical
investigation,  because  many  of  the  most  polluting  industries  are  also  highly  capital
intensive.3   
  The empirical literature in this area has progressed in three distinct ways.  First,
there are studies that primarily concern themselves with growth and  pollution  levels and
interpret their results as indicative of the relative strength of scale versus technique effects
(for  example, Grossman  and  Krueger  (1993,  1995),  Shafik  (1994),  Seldon  and  Song
(1994), Gale and Mendez (1996), and Dean (1998)).
   Many of these studies also add a
measure of openness as an additional explanatory variable.  There is a  second  group  of
studies that examines how trade flows may themselves be affected by the level of abatement
costs or strictness of pollution regulation in the trading partner countries.  This approach was
pioneered by Tobey (1990), and then employed in the context of the NAFTA agreement by
Grossman and Krueger (1993)  and  for  a  large cross  section of  countries by  Antweiler
                                                
3  See appendix B, section B.1 for evidence linking capital intensity and pollution intensity.    5
(1996).  Finally there are those studies that employ the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory to infer
how changes in production and trade flows has altered the pollution intensity of production
in both developed and developing countries.  Work along these lines includes Low and Yeats
(1992).
Overall the results from  these studies  are best  described as  mixed.    Apart  from
specific case studies, there is very little evidence linking liberalized trade in general  with
significant changes in the environment.  In addition, there is little evidence that differences in
abatement costs are a significant determinant of trade flows.  There is, however, evidence
that increases in income will, after a point, lead to lower concentrations of some pollutants.
But the role that trade plays in this process is not entirely clear.  Finally, there  is  some
evidence that the composition of exports of some developing countries have become dirtier
over time but these results  follow  only  from  a  relatively  narrow  set  of  toxic pollutants
recorded in the U.S. inventory.
Ideally an empirical investigation should be able to distinguish between the negative
environmental consequences of scalar increases in economic activity - the scale effect - and
the  positive  environmental  consequences  of  increases  in  income  that  call  for  cleaner
production methods - the technique effect.  Grossman and Krueger and others interpret their
hump-shaped Kuznets curve as reflecting  the relative  strength of  scale versus  technique
effects, but they do not provide separate estimates of their magnitude.4  As well, an empirical
investigation should be  able to  identify  how  trade affects average  pollution  intensity  of
national output by altering its composition.  Many studies include some measure of openness
in their regressions to capture a composition effect, but there is very little reason to believe
that openness per se affects the composition of output in all countries in the  same way.  
Without a measure of the compositional effects of trade, we cannot assess whether trade’s
real income gains come at the cost of a dirtier mix of national production.  Finally, many of
the existing studies have a very weak theoretical base and this makes inference  difficult.
Without a causal mechanism linking trade to consequent changes in the environment it is
difficult  to  isolate  the effects of  trade on  the  environment  from  other  factors  such  as
                                                
4  Moreover we would argue income per capita is not an appropriate measure of scale, and hence the
Grossman-Krueger finding does not reflect the relative strength of scale  and  technique  effects.  Gale  and
Mendez (1996) separate scale and technique effects by using city population figures, but their method is not
entirely satisfactory.  See section 3.2 for further discussion.  6
technological changes in abatement activity, capital accumulation, or other sources of real
income change.  
We would be the first to admit that our simple theoretical  model carries a  heavy
burden in providing us with the structure needed to isolate and identify the implications of
international trade.  We suggest however that earlier empirical investigations failed to find a
strong link between environmental outcomes and freer trade precisely because they lacked a
strong theoretical underpinning.  With a more coherent theoretical framework we are able to
look in the "right directions" for trade's effect.           
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we outline our
theory and in section 3 we describe our empirical strategy.  In section 4 we present our
empirical results estimating trade’s effect on pollution.  Section 5 concludes.  Appendix A
contains summary statistics for data, plus additional notes on data sources and  methods.
Appendix B contains some additional supporting materials.  In Appendix C we report results
from a series of sensitivity tests of our specification.   
2. Theory
2.1. The model
  A population of N agents lives in a small open economy that produces two  final
goods, X and Y, with two primary factors, labor, L, and capital, K.  Industry Y is labor
intensive and does not pollute.  Industry X is capital intensive and generates pollution as a
by-product.  We assume constant returns to scale, and hence the production technology for
X and Y can be described by unit cost functions cX(w,r) and cY(w,r).  We let Y be the
numeraire, set py = 1, and denote the relative price of X by p.
By choice of units, 1 unit of pollution is generated for each unit of X produced.  We
call this the  base  level  of  pollution  and  denote it by  B.    Producers  have access to  an
abatement technology however, which for simplicity we assume uses only good X as an
input.  For a given base level of pollution B, the amount of pollution abated, A, is given by
the function lA(xa,B), where xa is the amount of resources allocated to abatement. We will7
treat l as a parameter that may be affected by technological change. Pollution emissions are
then given by B minus A, or:
z =  [x – lA(xa,x)]. (2.1)
We assume  A(xa,x) is linearly homogeneous, increasing, and concave in xa and x.  Hence
we can write
A(xa,x) = xa(q),  (2.2)
where q = xa/x is the fraction of X output devoted to abatement, and a(q) º A(q,1).  We
assume there is no abatement without inputs, and that it is not possible to fully abate all
pollution: i.e. a(0) = 0 and la(1) < 1.  Note our specification implies increasing marginal
abatement costs since, for a given level of base pollution, there are diminishing returns to
abatement activity.  
Using (2.2), we can rewrite pollution emissions (2.1) as
z = x[1 – la(q)]. (2.3)
Producers
We can now  specify the equilibrium  conditions  for  the  production  side  of  the
economy.    We  assume  the  government  uses  pollution  emission  taxes  (which  are
endogenous) to  reduce pollution.    Given  the pollution  tax t,  the profits  px  for  a  firm
producing X are given by revenue, less production costs, pollution taxes, and abatement
costs:
px = px – cx(w,r) x – t[1 – la(q)]x – pqx. (2.4)
Firms will jointly choose gross output (x) and their abatement fraction q to maximize profits.
Define
p ~   =   p(1 – q) – t[1 – la(q)].
Then (2.4) becomes:
px = p ~ x – cx(w,r)x.
Because of constant returns to scale, the output of an individual firm is indeterminate, but for
any level of output, the first order condition for the choice of q implies  8
p = lta'(q).  (2.5)
(2.5) implicitly defines the optimal abatement q* as an increasing function of t/p:
q* = q(lt/p), (2.6)
where q' > 0.  As one would expect, abatement activity is increasing in the level of the
pollution tax.
With free entry, firms will enter each industry until profits are zero.  Using (2.4), we
have for the X industry
cx(w,r)  =  p ~     (2.7)
and for the Y industry, we have
cY (w,r) = 1. (2.8)
We assume both industries are active, and hence (2.7) and (2.8) determine factor
prices w and r as functions of p ~ .  Factor prices in turn determine the unit input coefficients
for each sector.  For example, by Shepherd's Lemma, the unit labor requirement in X is
given by c
x
w   º ¶cx/¶w, etc.  The full employment conditions then determine outputs:
c
x
w  x  +  c
Y
w  y  = L (2.9)
c
x
r  x  +  c
Y
r   y  = K (2.10)
where, as noted before,  x denotes gross output of X.  Net output of X (that remaining for
consumption and/or export) is  xn  =  x – xa =  x(1 – q).
Consumers
Each consumer maximizes utility, treating  pollution  as  given.  For  simplicity, we
assume preferences over consumption goods are homothetic and the marginal disutility of
pollution is constant. The indirect utility function of a typical consumer is given by
V(p,G/N,z)  =  u è æ ø ö G/N
  r(p)     – dz, (2.11)
where G is national income (so G/N is per capita income), r is a price index, u is increasing
and concave, and d is  the marginal disutility of pollution.  Note that pollution is harmful to9
consumers and is treated as a pure public bad (all consumers experience the same level of
pollution).
It is convenient to define real per capita income as
I º 
G/N
  r(p)   , (2.12)
 and rewrite the indirect utility as u(I) – dz.
Government
   Pollution policy is  determined  by  the government,  and  will vary  with  economic
conditions.  We model the policy process very simply by assuming the government sets a
pollution tax, and that the level of the tax is an increasing function of the optimal tax.  This
allows  for  the  possibility  that  government  behavior  varies  across  countries  (perhaps
depending on country characteristics and political systems), but also allows pollution policy
to respond endogenously to changing economic conditions.




  {N[u(I) – dz]} .
The solution to this problem yields
t*  = N df[p,I], (2.13)
where f = r(p)/u', and fI > 0 since u is concave. df[p,I] can be interpreted as marginal
damage per person, and hence (2.13) is just the standard Samuelson rule.  The pollution tax
is the sum of marginal  damages across  all individuals  and  is  increasing  in  real income
because environmental quality is a normal good.  
The actual pollution tax t is assumed to be an increasing function T of the optimal tax
t*:
t = T(t*),  (2.14)
where T' > 0, T(t*) £ t*, and we assume eT,t* £ 1. T depends on variables (suppressed
here) that reflect the responsiveness of the government to the efficient policy.  If policy is
always optimal, then the elasticity of T with respect to the optimal tax, eT,t* = 1.  10
The equilibrium level of pollution can now be determined by substituting (2.14) and
(2.6) into (2.3), and then using the market clearing conditions (2.7) - (2.10) to determine
output levels.
 2.2.  Scale, technique and composition effects
 Because the relationship between economic activity  and  environmental  quality  is
complex, it is useful to begin by decomposing the total effect of a change in pollution into
scale,  composition,  and  technique  effects.  To  investigate  further,  define  the  scale  of
economic activity S as the value of the economy's gross output at world prices:5
S = px + y. (2.15)
To define the composition effect it is convenient to work with x/y ratios.  Let c = x/y denote
the relative supply of X.  Solving (2.9) and (2.10) for x and y and dividing yields
x
y     = 
c
Y








      º  c(k,p ~ ), (2.16)
where k = K/L is the economy's capital labor ratio.  Note that c is increasing in k and p ~ ;
and therefore increasing in p and decreasing in t.6  We will  refer to  any  change in  the
economy that alters c(k,p ~ ) as creating a composition effect.  Using (2.15) and (2.16), we




   . (2.17)
To obtain our decomposition, totally differentiate (2.17) to yield:7
z
^     =  S
^
    +   jyc
^
    –   z ea,q q
^
      (2.18)
where "^" denotes "percent change", jy = y/(px+y) is the share of y in the value of gross
output, ea,q is the elasticity of a with respect to q, and z = la(q)x/z is the ratio of abated
                                                
5 There are other ways of defining scale.  We need a quantity index, and (2.15) is convenient for our
purposes.
6 To confirm this, note that c = x/y is increasing in p
~ , and that (using 2.5), dp
~   /dp = 1–q > 0, and        
dp
~   /dt = – (1-la(q)) < 0.
7 We hold world prices and the abatement technology constant throughout this section.  Section 2.3
considers changes in world prices and trade frictions.  11
pollution to actual pollution.  The first term is the scale effect.  Holding constant pollution
abatement techniques and the mix of goods produced, an increase in the scale of economic
activity will raise pollution.  Next is the composition effect.  Holding scale and techniques
constant, a shift in the composition of production towards more pollution intensive goods
will raise pollution.  Finally, the technique effect:  holding the scale and  composition  of
economic activity constant, pollution levels will fall in response to an increase in the intensity
of pollution abatement.  
According to (2.18), the observed variation in our pollution data arises from variation
in the scale, composition and techniques of economic activity across countries and over time.
We will adopt a quantity index of output to proxy for scale in our empirical work.  To relate
the composition and technique effects to observable variables as well, we differentiate (2.16)
and (2.6) to obtain expressions for c
^
  and q
^
  which we then substitute into (2.18).  This
yields
                         z
^     =  S
^
    +   jyec,k k
^    –   (jyatec,p ~   +  zea,qeq,t) t
^                    (2.19)
where eij denotes the elasticity of i with respect to j, and at = tl[1-a(q)]/p ~ .  Since we do
not observe policy directly in our data set, we must replace t
^  in (2.19) with its determinants.
From (2.13) and (2.14) we can write t
^  as:
t
^    = eT,t*[N
^
    +  ef,II
^
    +  d
^
 ]. (2.20)
The pollution tax depends on population size, real per capita income, and consumer tastes.
Now substitute (2.20) into (2.19), to obtain:
z
^    =   g1S
^
    +   g2 k
^    –   g3 I
^
    –   g4 N
^     –   g5d
^
  ,   (2.21)
where g1 = 1,  g2 = jyec,k  > 0,  g3 =  ef,I g4  > 0, g4 = eT,t*(jyqtec,p ~  + z ea,qeq,t)  > 0,
and g5 =   g4  > 0.
 The first term in (2.21) is the scale effect, as before.  The second term measures the
effect on pollution of an increase in the capital/labor ratio.  This is a composition effect.
Since the polluting industry is capital intensive, a more capital abundant country generates
more pollution, all else equal.  The remaining terms all reflect the  effects of  changes in
pollution policy; we will refer to them as technique effects.8  An increase in the level of per
                                                
8 In fact, because an increase in t also reduces p
~  (the producer price of x) ,  the technique effect is always
reinforced by an induced composition effect.  But for simplicity, we shall simply refer to the effects of policy
changes as a technique effect.12
capita income increases the demand for environmental quality, and leads to stricter pollution
policy (ef,I > 0); an increase in the number of people exposed (N
^   > 0) leads to stricter
pollution policy via the Samuelson rule; and an increase in the marginal disutility of pollution
(d
^
   > 0, which may arise from increased knowledge about pollution) will also increase the
demand for environmental quality and increase the pollution tax.   Finally it is worthwhile to
note the strength of these last three technique effects depends on eT,t*, which indexes the
government responsiveness to the preferences of the representative agent.   
Equation (2.21) neatly summarizes our predictions about how pollution varies across
countries and over time in response to observable variables (holding prices and the abatement
technology fixed).  Pollution rises with the scale of the economy and capital abundance.
Increases in income, the marginal disutility of pollution, and the number of people exposed
to pollution lead to a tightening of policy and a reduction in pollution.  Equation (2.21) is not
a suitable basis for estimation however because we have held both world and domestic prices
fixed in its derivation.      
2.3.  Increased openness
To examine the consequences of increased openness on pollution levels,  suppose
transport costs or other frictions act as a barrier to trade.  Given a common world price pw,
the domestic price in any country can be written,  
p = bpw
where b measures the importance of trade frictions.  Note b > 1 if a country imports X and b
< 1 if a country exports X.9 We refer to a movement of b towards 1  as  an  increase  in
openness, or freer trade.  Referring again to (2.18), recall that any change in the economy
(including an increase in openness) generates scale, technique and composition effects.  In
deriving (2.21) we held domestic prices fixed.  If we now allow for both trade frictions and
world prices to change we have
                                                
9 For example, let u be the level of iceberg transport costs (that is u < 1 is the fraction of the good that
arrives at the destination when a unit is exported).  Then if the good is exported from home, we have pd = u
pw, and if the good is imported, we have pd = pw/u.  Freer trade (an increase in u) raises pd if x is exported
and lowers pd if x is imported.13
p
^    =  b
^
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^    –   g3I
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    –   g4 N
^     –   g5d
^
    +   g6p
^
 
w   +  g7b
^
      (2.22)
where  g6 = g7 = jyec,p ~  + z ea,qeq,t(1 – eT,t*ef,p) > 0.10  The remaining gi are as defined
previously.  As before, pollution varies with scale, capital abundance, income levels, etc. but
as well, pollution now also varies with world prices and trade frictions.   
Equation (2.22) is very important to our subsequent analysis because it establishes
one key result and naturally leads to a discussion of how we identify the impact of trade in
our empirical work.  The key result contained in (2.22) is simply that a reduction in trade
frictions will affect different countries in different ways.  We  should  not  expect  to  find
openness per se related in any systematic way to pollution.  This follows because b rises
with freer trade for an exporter of the polluting good and b falls for an importer.  While the
coefficient of  b ^  is positive, an increase in openness yields b ^  > 0  for a country with a
comparative advantage in dirty goods, and b ^  < 0 for a country with a comparative advantage
in clean goods. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.  
Proposition 1.  Consider  two  economies  which  are identical,  except  with  respect to
openness  (that  is,  they  have  the  same  scale,  per  capita  income,  population,  tastes,
technology, and relative factor  abundance).    (a)  Suppose  that both  countries export the
polluting good.  Then pollution is higher in the country that has lower trade frictions.  (b)
Suppose that both countries import the  polluting  good.    Then pollution  is  lower  in  the
country that has lower trade frictions.
Proof:  Suppose country 1 has lower trade frictions than country 2.  In case (a), we have b1
< b2.  In case (b) we have b2 < b1.  Now apply (2.22).
                                                
10 The result that g6 > 0 requires a restriction on eT,t*.  A sufficient condition for  g6 > 0 is  that
eT,t*ef,p £ 1.  From Roy's Identity and the definition of f following (2.13), we have ef,p = jxc < 1, where
jxc is the share of x in consumption spending.   If policy is always perfect or if the government is less than
fully responsive to changes in the optimal tax, then eT,t* £ 1, and the result follows.   14
The means by which a country is made cleaner or dirtier works through its impact on
domestic relative prices.  When b ^   > 0 (or when p
^ w > 0) the relative price of the pollution
intensive good rises.  Holding the abatement intensity constant, an increase in the relative
price of X stimulates the output of X, and hence increases pollution via this composition
effect.  Second, for given levels of the pollution tax, an increase in the price of X increases
the cost of abatement activity and this also increases pollution. When b ^   < 0 (or when p
^ w <
0) just the opposite occurs. 
While all countries in our sample will respond similarly to a change in world prices,
their response to a change in trade frictions depends on their comparative advantage.  This
feature of our theory provides a method for identifying the composition effect created by
freer trade.  It suggests that some of the variation in our pollution data could be explained by
a country’s openness, but only after we have conditioned on those country characteristics
that determine comparative advantage.  
It is important to recognize that a fall in trade frictions or change in world prices alters
both the scale of  economic  activity  and  income  per  capita  in  addition  to  those  changes
mentioned above.  As a result, the full impact of a reduction in trade frictions is not captured
by the coefficient on b ^ .  The b ^   term is a trade-induced composition effect, holding scale
and per capita income fixed.  A full accounting of the impact of further openness would have
to take into account the induced scale and technique effects as well as any trade-induced
composition effect.  Totally differentiating (2.17) with respect to b, holding all else except
trade frictions constant yields:
z
^    =   g1S
^
    –   g3I
^
    +   g7b
^     
A fall in trade frictions results in an increase in economic activity and this scale effect
increases pollution.  There will also be an  increase  in  real per  capita  income  creating  a
technique effect.  And finally, there is the composition effect discussed previously.  We will
not attempt to measure how a reduction in trade frictions alters either the scale of economic
activity or income per capita in our empirical work.  The scale of the economy and real per
capita income are influenced by many factors in addition to openness to trade.  Identifying
the separate influence of trade on growth and on static income levels is the subject of an
already voluminous, and somewhat controversial, literature.  Our strategy is to provide a
direct estimate of the composition effect created by an increase in openness by controlling for
scale and per capita income.  We also provide estimates linking the scale of economic activity15
and income levels to pollution concentrations.   We then use economic theory to tell us how
to combine our estimates of scale, technique and (trade-induced) composition effects in order
to assess the environmental consequences of freer trade.11
The pattern of trade
Proposition 1 tells us that looking for a simple correlation between openness and
environmental quality is unlikely to be fruitful.  Rather, we have to focus on the link between
openness, comparative advantage, and pollution.  Hence we need to take study the factors
determining a country's comparative advantage.  In our model, comparative advantage is
determined by the interplay of relative factor endowments and differences in pollution policy,
(which are mainly due to differences in per capita income).  To investigate the determinants
of comparative advantage we solve for autarky relative prices.    
Because preferences over consumption goods are homothetic and there are constant
returns to scale in production we can use relative supply and demand curves to determine
autarky prices.  Recalling that p denotes the relative price of good x, let RD(p) denote the
demand for good x relative to good y. Then the autarky relative price of good x is determined
by the intersection of the (net) relative supply and demand curves
RD(p)  = (1–q)c(k,p ~ ) (2.23)
where the gross relative supply c = x/y is defined by (2.16), and net relative supply is
(1–q)c.  Totally differentiating and using (2.13), we obtain an expression showing how
autarky prices vary with income and endowments:
p ^     =  
 – e c,k k
^  + e T ,t*ef,Ië é û ù atec,p ~ + ze q,t I ^
L
 , (2.24)   
where L = apec,p ~   + z eq,t – eT,t*ef,p[atec,p ~   +  z eq,t] – eRD,p > 0.
The pattern of trade is determined by the interaction of two influences: relative factor
abundance and pollution policy.  Pollution policy in turn is influenced by income.  To show
how each of these factors affect comparative advantage let us consider them separately.  
                                                
11  See section 4.3.  16
The role of factor endowments  
Standard factor endowment theories predict that capital abundant countries  should
export capital intensive goods.  In our model this need not be true because pollution policy
can potentially reverse the pattern of trade.  Nevertheless, capital abundance is still one of the
key determinants of comparative advantage in our model.  Because X is relatively capital
intensive, an increase in k, holding all else constant,  increases Home's relative supply of X,
and lowers Home's autarky relative price of X.  [Using (2.24), we obtain p ^    < 0 since ec,k
> 0].  All else equal, an increase in the relative  abundance  of  the factor used  relatively
intensively in the pollution intensive sector should increase the likelihood that a country will
be an exporter of pollution intensive goods.  More concretely,  we  can show  that if  the
country is sufficiently capital abundant, it must export the capital intensive (polluting) good:   
Proposition 2.  Suppose the world price p is fixed.  Then, for a given level of income I,
there exists      k       such that if k >      k      , then Home exports X.  Moreover, for such a country, the
pure composition effect of trade liberalization will be to increase pollution.
Proof.  For a given p and I, Home's relative demand RD(p) is fixed.  Relative supply c is
given by (2.16) for the case where the economy is diversified in both goods. For given p
and I, the unit input coefficients in (2.11) are fixed, and hence c approaches infinity as k
rises.  Consequently, there exists some      k       such that for k >      k      ,  c exceeds relative demand,
and hence Home exports X.  The increase in pollution via the composition effect follows
from Prop.  1.
The role of income differences  
An alternative theory of trade patterns is the pollution haven hypothesis.  According
to this view, poor countries have a comparative advantage in dirty goods because they have
relatively lax pollution policy, and rich countries  have a  comparative  advantage  in  clean17
goods because of their stringent pollution policy.12  This result can be obtained as a special
case of our model: if all countries have the same relative factor endowments, but differ in per
capita incomes, then indeed richer countries will have stricter pollution policy and this will
lead to a comparative advantage in clean goods. When countries differ in factor endowments
as well, then we can obtain a weaker result: if a country is sufficiently rich, holding all else
constant, then it will export the clean good.
As before, we begin by determining domestic prices prior to trade.  Consider the
effects of increasing income in a country, holding relative factor abundance constant. In this
case, (2.24) reduces to
p ^     =  
eT,t*ef,Ië é û ù atec,p ~ + ze q,t I ^
L
 , (2.25)   
Since environmental quality is a normal good, we have ef,I  > 0.  Hence we conclude from
(2.25) that  p ^    > 0.  In autarky, the relative price of the pollution intensive good rises with
per capita income if we control for relative factor abundance.  Hence high income, all else
equal, tends to  generate  a  comparative  disadvantage  in  pollution  intensive  goods.  More
concretely, we can show that if the country is sufficiently rich, it must  export the labor
intensive (clean) good.  
Proposition 3.  Suppose the world price p is fixed and there exists     e      such that ef,I >     e      >
0.  Then, for a given level of the capital/labor ratio k (and holding all else constant), there
exists     I     , such that if I >     I     , then Home exports Y.   Moreover, for such a country, the pure
composition effect of trade liberalization will be to reduce pollution.
Proof:  The relative price of x facing producers is p ~   =  p(1 – q) – tl(1 – a(q)) < p(1 – q) –
tl(1 – a(1)) where la(1) < 1).  Because ef,I >     e      , the pollution tax increases without bound
as income rises (and moreover q rises), and hence there must exist some I for which p ~  falls
to  0,  in  which  case the output of  X  is  0.    The relative  demand  for  X  is,  however,
independent of income.  Hence for sufficiently large I, Home must import X and export Y.
The fall in pollution follows from Prop.1.
                                                
12 See Copeland and Taylor (1994) for a model that explores this issue.18
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 contain the major implications of our model. Proposition 1
tells us that international trade has an impact on environmental quality that varies with the
comparative advantage of a country.  If we compare countries with similar  incomes and
scale,  we  expect  to  find  openness  associated  with  higher pollution  in  countries with  a
comparative advantage in the polluting good, and openness associated with lower pollution
in countries with a comparative advantage in the clean good.  This observation suggests that
conditioning on country characteristics is important if we are to isolate trade’s composition
effect.  Proposition 2 and 3 give us some limiting results concerning the determinants of
comparative advantage.  Even though comparative advantage is set by the complex interplay
of income differences and relative factor abundance, these results indicate that if a country is
sufficiently rich then the pollution haven motive for trade will eventually outweigh factor
endowment considerations and this country will export the clean good in trade.  Similarly, if
a country is sufficiently capital abundant then the factor  endowment basis  for  trade will
eventually outweigh any pollution haven motive for trade and this country will export the
dirty good.  The theory is perhaps at its weakest here because it does not provide a simple
definition  of  either  sufficiently  rich or  sufficiently  capital  abundant.    But  it  should  be
recognized that these definitions would have to be functions of the entire distribution of both
factor abundance and per-capita income in the world as a whole.   
3. Empirical Strategy
This section describes how we move from our theory to an estimating equation.  To
do so we need to discuss our data, its sources and limitations (section 3.1) and then  address
the links between theory and our estimating equation (section 3.2).   19
3.1 Data Sources and Measurement Issues
 A real world pollutant useful for our purposes would: (1) be a by-product of goods
production; (2) be emitted in greater quantities per unit of output in some industries than
others; (3) have strong local effects; (4) be subject to regulations because of its  noxious
effect  on  the  population;  (5)  have  well  known  abatement  technologies  available  for
implementation;  and  (6),  for  econometric  purposes  have  data  available  from  a  mix  of
developed and developing and “open” and “closed” economies.  An almost perfect choice for
this study is sulfur dioxide.  
Sulfur dioxide is a noxious gas produced by the burning of fossil  fuels.  Natural
sources  occur from  volcanoes,  decaying  organic matter  and  sea  spray.    Anthropogenic
sources are thought to be responsible for somewhere between one-half to one-third of all
emissions (UNEP (1991), Kraushaar (1988)).  Emissions in developed countries accrue to a
large extent  from  electricity  generation  and  the  smelting  of  non-ferrous  ores;  in  some
developing countries  diesel fuel and  home heating  are also  large contributors.    SO2  is
primarily emitted as either a direct or indirect product of goods production and is not strongly
linked to automobile use.  As a result, because energy intensive industries are also typically
capital intensive, a reasonable proxy for dirty SO2 creating activities may be physical capital
intensive production processes.  
SO2 emissions can be controlled by altering the techniques of production in three
ways.  By the process of flue gas desulphurization (adding scrubbers to flue stacks), by
altering the combustion process of fuels, and by a change to lower sulfur content  fuels.
Therefore, readily available although costly methods for the control of emissions exist and
their efficacy is well established.  In addition, in many countries SO2 emissions have been
actively regulated for some time.  
The Global Environment  Monitoring  System  (GEMS)  has  been  recording  SO2
concentrations in major urban areas in developed and developing countries since the early
1970s.  Our data set consists of 2621 observations from 293 observation sites located in 109
cities representing 44 countries spanning the years 1971-1996.13   The GEMS network was
                                                
13  We have only a handful of data points (two or three observations) for some countries.  Accordingly we
do not draw any country specific conclusions for these countries.   20
set up to monitor the concentrations of several pollutants in a cross section of countries using
comparable  measuring devices.14    The panel of  countries  includes  primarily  developed
countries  in  the  early  years,  but  from  1976  to  the  early  1990s  the  United  Nations
Environment Programme provided funds to expand and maintain the network.  The coverage
of developing economies grew over time until the late 1980s.  In the 1990s coverage has
fallen with data only from the US for 1996.   WHO (1984) reports that until the late 1970s
data comparability may be limited as monitoring capabilities were being assessed, many new
countries were added, and procedures were being developed to ensure validated samples.
Accordingly, we investigate the sensitivity of our findings to the time period, but leave the
reporting of these (largely confirming results) to Appendix C.   
The GEMS data is comprised of summary statistics for several percentiles  of  the
yearly distribution for concentrations at each site together with highest recorded values and
both  geometric  and  arithmetic  means.    In  this  study  we  use  the  log  of  median  SO2
concentrations at a given site, for each year, as our  dependent  variable.   We use  a  log
transform because the distribution of yearly summary statistics for SO2 appears to be log
normal (WHO (1984)). Previous work in this area by the WHO and others has argued that a
log  normal  distribution  is  appropriate  because  temperature  inversions  or  other  special
pollution  episodes  often lead to  large values for  some  observations.  In  contrast,  even
weather very helpful to dissipation cannot drive  the natural  level  of  the pollutant  below
zero.15
In addition to the data on concentrations the GEMS network also classifies each site
within a city as either city center, suburban or rural in land type, and we employ these land
type categories in our analysis. A list of the cities involved, the years of operation of GEMS
stations, and the number of observations from each city is given in Appendix A.   
In moving from our theoretical model to its empirical counterpart we need to include
variables to reflect scale, technique and composition effects.  As well, we have to include
site-specific variables to account for the density  of  economic  activity  and  meteorological
                                                
14  The range of sophistication of monitoring techniques used in the network varies quite widely, but the
various techniques have been subject to comparability tests over the years.  Some stations offer continuous
monitoring while others only measure at discrete intervals.
15  For further information on the distribution of SO2 see appendix A, and our discussion of alternative
transformations in appendix C.2.21
conditions.  Our estimations will require the use of data on real GDP per capita, capital to
labor ratios, population densities, and various measures of “openness”.  The majority of the
economic data were obtained from the Penn World Tables 5.6.  The remainder was obtained
from several sources.  A full description of data sources and our methods for collection are
provided in Appendix A together with a table of means, standard deviations, and units of
measurement for the data.    
3.2 Linking Theory to the Estimating Equation
To derive an estimating equation, assume measured concentrations at any observation
site are a function of  the country specific  economic  determinants  of  emissions,  E; site-
specific meteorological and density variables (V); common  to  world  trends  in  abatement
technology and world prices (C); and a site-specific error e that includes other relevant, but
unmeasured determinants of pollution, plus an idiosyncratic measurement  error  reflecting
human and machine error.  If we take a Taylor series approximation to this general functional
form we can then write pollution concentrations at site i, city j, in country k, at time t as
zijkt
E = bEEijkt + bVVijkt
  + bCCt + eijkt     (3.1)
where  bE,bV and bC  are parameter  vectors and  Eijkt,  Vijkt
    and  Ct  represent  vectors  of
regressors to be explained below.  
Economic Determinants
The economic determinants we include in  E,  follow  quite directly  from  equation
(2.22) relating differences in emissions across countries  (or differences within a country
over time) to differences in country characteristics and trade frictions.  We reproduce (2.22)
below:
z
^    =  g1S
^
    +   g2k
^    –   g3I
^
    –   g4 N
^     –   g5d
^
    +   g6p
^
 
w   +  g7b
^
      (2.22)22
In our empirical work we measure the scale of activity at any site, S, by constructing
an intensive measure of economic activity per unit area.  This intensive measure is GDP per
square kilometer. Lacking detailed data on “Gross City Product”, we construct GDP per
square kilometer for each city and each year by multiplying city population  density with
country GDP per person.   This measure has two key benefits. First, it  is  measured in
intensive form, as is our dependent variable.
   To explain concentrations of pollution we need
a  measure  of  scale  reflecting  the  concentration  of  economic  activity  within  the  same
geographical area.  Other possible proxies for scale fail this test: GDP per person makes no
allowance for cities of different size; GDP scaled by city population makes no allowance for
cities of different density.  Only GDP per square kilometer captures differences in the flow
of economic activity per unit area across cities that vary in population size and density.  
A second benefit of our measure is that it allows for heterogeneity across cities within
the same country in the scale of economic activity.  This within-country heterogeneity is key
to disentangling the technique and scale effects.
  
 
The composition  effect  is  captured  by  capital  abundance,  k,  as  measured  by  a
nation’s capital to labor ratio.  We implicitly assume that this ratio is the same for all cities
within a country.   In our estimations we will include both a country’s capital to labor ratio
and its square.  This non-linearity is appealing because theory suggests capital accumulation
should have a diminishing effect at the margin.   
We proxy our technique effect by a moving average of lagged income, I.  Because
we believe the transmission of income gains into policy is both slow and reflects long run
averages, we use as our proxy for income a (one period lagged) three year moving average
of GDP per capita. We have also allowed the technique effect to have a diminishing impact at
the margin by entering both the level and the square of  income  per  capita  in  all of  our
regressions.
Population size, N, appears in (2.22) because the Samuelson rule sums  marginal
damage over all individuals exposed to a unit of pollution.  Air pollution standards are in
most countries uniform throughout the country with the actual level of the standard either set
by, or heavily influenced by, national governments.
  Since policy is nation wide, our theory
would indicate that the relevant regressor arising from the Samuelson rule would be some
average  number  of  exposed  individuals  taken  from  a  mix  of  metropolitan  and  non-
metropolitan areas in the country.  Exposure would also have to  reflect  country specific23
disbursement potential and weather patterns.  Since we have very little confidence in our
ability to construct a suitable proxy, we treat this factor as an unobservable component in our
error term.   
Changes in tastes or knowledge concerning pollution, plus changes in world prices
are treated as common-to-world trends and are discussed subsequently in  the section on
common-to-world determinants.    
Finally our theory ties trade frictions b to pollution concentrations, but the sign of
this  composition  effect  depends  on  a  country’s  comparative  advantage.    Comparative
advantage is in turn a function of a country’s income per capita and its capital abundance.  To
capture this feature in our empirical work we proceed as follows.  First, we need a measure
to reflect the extent to which international trade affects the domestic economy.  We adopt for
this purpose a country’s trade intensity ratio: the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP.  This
proxy accords well with our theory because a movement of b towards 1 raises the ratio of
exports plus imports to GDP for any country.  
Second,  we  then need to  condition  this  impact  on  country  characteristics.    To
condition the impact of openness on country characteristics we interact the trade intensity
measure with our model’s predicted determinants of comparative advantage.   Within  our
framework the  most  important  country  characteristics  determining  trade  patterns  are  a
country’s capital to labor ratio and its income per capita.  Moreover, because comparative
advantage is a relative concept, we express our measures of country characteristics relative to
their corresponding world averages.16 This procedure allows us to condition the predicted
environmental impact of further openness on our theoretical  determinants  of  comparative
advantage.
Finally, we need to somehow account for the two possible motives for trade when
we introduce our interaction terms with country characteristics.    In  general  the trade-off
between the factor endowment basis for trade and the pollution haven motive is exceedingly
complex and not amenable to simple formulation.17  Rather than imposing specific functional
                                                
16  See appendix A for details.
17  Without imposing severe restrictions on the relative factor intensities in the two industries, elasticities
of substitution in production, and elasticities of marginal damage from pollution it is not possible to state
precisely how these two potentially offsetting characteristics interact to determine a nation’s comparative
advantage.24
forms that arise from some tractable special cases of our model, we  instead rely on  the
results presented in Proposition 2 and 3.  Because our theory does not tell us at what point
further increases in the capital to labor ratio raise pollution (via the composition effect) or
when increases in per capita income finally lower pollution (via the composition effect), we
adopt a flexible approach to estimation. We interact  a  quadratic  in  a  country’s  (relative)
characteristics with its trade intensity ratio.  
We then expect our interacted quadratic in relative capital to labor to imply a positive
impact of further openness for high capital to labor ratios but a negative effect for lower
levels.  Proposition 2 shows that regardless of a country’s other characteristics if its capital
to labor ratio is sufficiently high relative to those of its trading partners then it must export
good X.18 Alternatively, if its capital to labor ratio is relatively low then it must import good
X.  This partial result reflects the factor endowment hypothesis.  
Similarly  we  expect  that our  quadratic  in  relative  income  per  capita  to  imply  a
negative impact of further openness on concentrations for high incomes but a positive effect
for lower incomes. Proposition 3 indicates that regardless of other country characteristics, if
a country’s income per capita is sufficiently high it must import good X.  Alternatively if its
income per capita is relatively low, it must export good X.   This partial result reflects the
pollution haven hypothesis.
Site-specific Determinants
 Since our  data are observations of  ground  level  SO2  concentrations  at sites  in
various participating cities around the world  it is  apparent  that site-specific  weather and
topographical conditions may have a large bearing on concentration levels for any given level
of emissions.  Unmeasured topographical features are captured in some of our estimations
through site-specific fixed and random effects. In earlier research,  measured site-specific
influences such as proximity to oceans or deserts have sometimes proven useful19.   Our
                                                
18  Strictly speaking the proposition says that if a country's capital to labor ratio exceeds some threshold
level taking income I and world price p as given then the composition effect of trade must be positive.  In
fact world prices are determined by the rest of world's abundance in capital and hence our relative statement in
the text.     
19  See for example Grossman and Krueger (1993).25
experience  with  these variables  has  been that they are rarely significant  in  determining
concentrations.  In addition to site-specific fixed effects we also employ city-specific weather
variables to capture differences across cities in their natural cleansing abilities and in seasonal
influences on emissions. While weather variables are unlikely to be strongly correlated with
our economic variables their inclusion may help us obtain more accurate estimates.    To
capture seasonal influences on the demand for fuels and hence emissions of SO2 we include
the average monthly temperature from each site.   As well we have included the variation in
precipitation  at the  site  as  well  to  proxy  for  the  ability  of  precipitation  to  wash  out
concentrations.  If precipitation is largely concentrated in one season then its ability to wash
out concentrations over the year is reduced.  Seasonal influences have been found to  be
important in similar studies (See for example WHO (1984)).
Common-to-World Determinants, Error Components and Excluded Variables
  We assume our error term eijkt is composed of three elements.  First, a common-to-
world  but  time  varying  component  lt  reflecting  trends  in  the  public’s  awareness  of
environmental problems, in abatement technology, and in world prices.  We capture these
common-to-world components via a linear time trend.20 Second, we include time invariant
site components qijk to reflect unmeasured meteorological or topographical features of a site
as well as any time invariant country-specific effects such as government or country type.
And finally we include an idiosyncratic component nijkt  reflecting both human and machine
measurement error at the site.   Most of these assumptions are not controversial, although the
issue of government type deserves some discussion.  
In developing our model we allowed pollution policy to be flexible and responsive to
changes in the economy.  In contrast, we took the  existing level  of  trade frictions b as
exogenous.  Since trade frictions undoubtedly contain a component reflecting trade policy we
have in fact taken this part of policy as exogenous.  This assumption may be problematic if
pollution and trade policies are correlated because political economy considerations, income
levels, and other factors jointly determine them.  Consider for example government type.
                                                
20  In appendix C we show that our results are not affected by allowing for a full set of unrestricted time
dummies as well.  26
Suppose our sample of countries was divided into two types: democracies and communist
countries.  Suppose democracies are both relatively open and fairly clean, while communist
countries are relatively  closed to  trade and  very  dirty.    As  a  result,  if  we  ignore  the
correlation of trade and environmental policy induced by political systems, our trade intensity
measure may be correlated with our equation’s error term.  All else equal, open economies
will appear  cleaner because they are open rather than because they are democracies.   
In this simple case, the problem is not difficult to remedy and we do so by allowing
for a communist dummy in our estimations.21    In  other cases  such  a  simple fix  is  not
available.    Many  of  the  candidate  measures  of  trade  frictions  or  “openness”  may  be
contaminated by other more subtle country characteristics that jointly determine trade and
environmental policy.  For example, the trade intensity variable we employ reflects country
type considerations  such  as  proximity  to  markets,  geographic  size and  natural  resource
endowments and in general tends to be highest for small countries within close proximity to
their trading partners.  Because our pollutant under study is well known to have serious
transboundary effects, there may be a correlation between countries with  large measured
openness and SO2 regulation.22 The openness measure developed by  Sachs  and  Warner
(1995) and measures of the black-market exchange-rate premium also suffer from similar
problems.
Panel-data methods  offer  different  ways  to  deal with  the possibility  of  country-
specific and/or site-specific excluded variables. When such effects  are viewed simply as
parametric shifts of our regression  function,  a  suitable  estimation  approach is  the least-
squares dummy-variable (i.e., fixed-effects) estimator that treats these effects as constants.
This approach is appropriate when the model is viewed as applying only to the countries or
observation sites in the sample but not to additional ones outside the sample. If, however,
the model is viewed as  a  random draw  of  countries or  observation sites  from  a  larger
population, it is appropriate to use a random-effects estimator  to  capture  the level  effect
                                                
21  Further, in some estimations we interact this dummy with our income per capita terms to  test the
hypothesis that communist governments care little about their public’s demand for a cleaner environment.  
22  For example, many countries in Europe are very open by our measure while the U.S. is not.  At the
same time, European countries are much more sensitive to, and aware of, the problems caused by acid rain
than is the U.S.  Therefore, there may be a cross-sectional negative correlation between SO2 concentrations
and openness as measured in our data set.  Once again we must be careful about using the cross-sectional
variation in our data set.  We do not want to attribute to openness or trade what is due to geography.   27
through a random variable.  Because this estimator treats the level effects as uncorrelated
with the other regressors, it may suffer from inconsistency due to omitted variables.  By
comparison, the fixed-effects estimator does not suffer from this inconsistency problem, but
it focuses exclusively on the variation over time in our data.  Acknowledging the strengths
and weaknesses of both types of  estimators,  our  strategy is  to  estimate  both  fixed and
random effects versions of our model whenever possible.  We also report results from the
Hausman test comparing these two methods.23  Occasionally we are forced to rely on the
random effects implementation alone because some of our regressors would not be identified
in  a  fixed effects estimation.    Both  of  these  methods  have  been  widely  used  in  the
literature.24         
  
The Estimation Equation
Combining  the  economic,  site-specific,  and  common-to-world  components  we
obtain:
 
     zijkt = b0 + b1GDPjkt + b2KLkt + b3(KLkt)
2
 +  b4Ikt +  b5(Ikt)
2
 +
         b6Rijk  + b7Bijk + b8Mjkt
T + b9Mjkt
P + b10Okt  + b11Okt RKLkt +
                 b12Okt (RKLkt)
2 +  b13Okt RIkt + b14Okt (RIkt)
2 + eijkt (3.2)
where GDPjkt is measured by real GDP/km
2, KLkt is measured by the capital to labor ratio,
Ikt is one period lagged three year moving average of GDP per capita,  Rijk  is  a  dummy
indicating site ijk is in a rural location, Bijk is a dummy indicating site ijk is in a suburban
location, Mjkt
T is average temperature in city j at time t,  Mjkt
P is the variation in precipitation
in city j at time t, Okt is measured by the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, Okt RKLkt  and
Okt (RKLkt)
2 are interactions of openness with country k’s relative capital to labor ratio and
                                                
23  Moulton (1987) cautions against misinterpreting the Hausman test.  The fixed-effects estimator is very
sensitive to errors-in-variables.  Rejection of the Hausman test could be due to either correlation between the
regressors and the group effects, or bias from errors-in-variables intensified under the fixed-effects model.  
24  See for example Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995), Seldon and Song (1995), Shafik (1994), etc.28
its square, and Okt RIkt
C and Okt (RIkt)
2 are interactions of openness with country k’s income
per  capita  and  its  square.    In  addition  to  these determinants  we  include  a  dummy  for
communist countries in all of our estimations.  
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy has four steps.  We first estimate (3.2) excluding the  terms
involving openness to determine whether our simple model specification  capturing  scale,
composition  and  technique  effects is  useful  in  explaining  pollution  concentration  levels
around the world.  We then take a second step by adding several measures of “openness” to
our basic model and noting the consequences.  Our purpose here is to investigate whether a
simple and  definitive  relationship  exists  between openness  to  international  markets  and
pollution concentrations (after controlling for differences across countries in  scale,  factor
endowments, etc.)  In our third step, we include our openness interactions to allow trade’s
effect to differ across countries.  Our theory would suggest that conditioning the impact of
further openness on country characteristics is the key to determining how trade affects the
pollution intensity of national output.  In our fourth and final step we combine our scale,
technique and trade intensity elasticities to provide a preliminary assessment of how trade
affects SO2 concentrations.  
 Scale, Composition and Technique Effects
Table 1 presents initial estimates from our random and fixed effect implementation of
(3.2).  There are three important properties shown in the table.  
First, there is a comforting consistency across the regressions in both the size and
sign of the estimated coefficients.  Second, at conventional levels of significance the vast
majority of all coefficients are statistically different from zero.  Third, the results are almost
universally in line with the theory detailed in section 2.  TABLE 1: THE DETERMINANTS OF SO
2 CONCENTRATION































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% conﬁ-
dence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. Dependent variable is the log of
the median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site.
TABLE 2: ISOLATING TRADE’S EFFECT:AF IRST STEP
Openness Black Avg. Avg. Sachs&
(X+M) Market Tariff Quota Warner










































































































































Note: The results shown were obtained through a random-effects estimation. T-
statistics are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% conﬁdence
levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. Dependent variable is the log of the
median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site. Note that the black market
premium, average tariff and quota coverage variables measure the inverse of open-
ness; their sign has thus to be reversed to interpret the direction of the estimates as
an increase in openness.30
Consider our core variables representing scale, composition and technique effects.
In both columns of table 1 we find a positive relationship between the scale of economic
activity as measured by GDP/km
2 and concentrations.  Similarly, both columns report that an
increase in the capital labor ratio raises emissions - consistent with a positive composition
effect - albeit increases in this ratio have a diminishing impact much as we may expect.  This
diminishing effect probably reflects a lower average pollution intensity of capital equipment
in  high-income  countries.    Our theory predicts that high-income  countries  have  tighter
standards  in  place,  and  this  in  turn  implies  the  pollution  consequences  of  capital
accumulation should fall as development proceeds.  Finally, the income per  capita  terms
indicate a strong and significantly negative relationship between per capita income levels and
concentrations.  We again find a diminishing effect but it is less pronounced than that for the
capital to labor ratio.25     
From table 1 it also appears that our strategy for identifying the separate, but related,
impacts of changes in scale and technique is successful.  Recall that since scale is measured
in the intensive form GDP/km
2 there is within-country heterogeneity in the scale variable for
most countries.  If, as we assume, pollution policy is determined by average income per
capita in a country, then variation in the scale variable across cities within the same country
can be  used  to  separate  the influence  of  scale from  that of  technique.     Therefore  the
recognition  that scale should  be  measured in  intensive  form  together  with  a  theoretical
restriction linking policy to national income allows us to disentangle these two effects in our
data.   
In addition to these observations table 1 also reports that  it may be  important  to
distinguish between communist and non-communist countries. This would appear to support
our concerns  to  distinguish carefully  across  countries according  to  the type of  political
system.  If we investigate further and interact the communist dummy with our income terms
reflecting the technique effect we find that pollution concentrations in communist countries
are much less responsive to increases in real income.  This result is consistent with  our
theory as it implies that eT,t*  is must smaller for communist countries.  In the fixed effects
case,  the elasticity  of  concentrations  to  an  increase  in  per  capita  income  in  communist
                                                
25  We have estimated the turning points for both quadratics and their confidence intervals.  These estimates
and their confidence intervals can vary quite widely according to the specification.  Our robust finding is that
of a diminishing effect at the margin.  The turning points may or may not fall outside of the sample range.  31
countries has a point estimate of 0.594 but the 95% confidence interval includes zero and is
given by (-0.139,1.326).  And hence we cannot reject the hypothesis of no technique effect
in communist countries!  In the random effects case, the point estimate is -0.587 with a 95%
confidence interval of (-1.062,-0.111).  We have excluded the communist-income interaction
terms from table 1 to avoid clutter, but include them in all subsequent regressions.  
It also appears that weather has a significant affect on concentrations.  We find an
increase in average temperature reduces concentrations as we may expect, and an increase in
the concentration of yearly precipitation raises concentrations.   Finally, the estimates indicate
that locations in less dense areas, either suburban or rural locations, experience less pollution
than locations at city center (our excluded category).  
Isolating Trade's Effect
We now  investigate  several relatively  simple hypotheses  regarding the  effect  of
international trade on pollution concentrations by adding various measures of "openness" to
the random effect implementation of our model.    We are forced to  limit  ourselves  to  a
random effect implementation because many of the candidate measures of openness are not
identified  in  a  fixed effect  implementation.    The estimated  coefficient  for  the  openness
variable introduced in each regression is reported in table 2 below.  All other estimates are
suppressed because the inclusion of the additional variable had very little if any impact on the
other estimates as reported in table 1.26     
The new variables are:  (1)  the ratio of  exports  plus  imports to  GDP  (i.e.  trade
intensity); (2) a measure of the black market premium in foreign exchange markets over the
1970s and 1980s (BMP); (3) the average level of tariffs on imports over 1985-88 (Tariffs);
(4) the percent of imports affected by a quota over 1985-1988 (Quotas); and (5), an indicator
variable created by Sachs and Warner (1995) reflecting a country's policy stance  toward
trade (Sachs).   All of these measures except for the trade intensity measure were taken from
Sachs and Warner (1995, p65-66).  
In their  study  of  the NAFTA,  Grossman  and  Krueger  (1993)  employ the trade
intensity measure and report a significant and negative relationship between concentrations
                                                
26  See appendix B for the complete set of estimates.32
and trade intensity.  We establish a similar result although the variable is not significant at
conventional levels.  We note that the black market premium enters positively, suggesting
that moving away from world markets and restricting convertibility may be correlated with
an increase in pollution concentrations, although again this relationship is not significant at
conventional levels. There is little to report regarding the relationship between concentrations
and tariff levels, but there appears to be a positive relationship between quota coverage and
concentrations.  The Sachs and Warner measure in column 5 appears to add little as well.
  Overall the estimates given in table 2 offer very little evidence of a strong relationship
between openness, however measured, and resulting pollution concentrations.  It is possible
to pick and choose carefully from the table to craft a story where openness to international
markets is good for the environment.  Neglecting statistical significance, we could note that
an increase in openness lowers pollution, while a rise in quota coverage or a movement away
from international markets and currency convertibility raises pollution.  This reading of table
2 is, however, very selective.  
Our reading of table 2 is far less complex: the lack of any significant relationship
between concentrations  and  openness  is  exactly  what  we  might  expect  to  find.    After
controlling for other differences across countries, the impact of further openness on pollution
should, in theory, only reflect the induced composition effect of trade.  But the sign of this
trade-created composition effect  should  vary  with  country characteristics.    If  we  fail to
condition  on  country  characteristics,  then  we  are  at  best  measuring  an  average,
unconditional, effect of openness.  This unconditional response may be positive or negative
and will depend on the characteristics of countries in our sample.   
4.2.  A Second Step: Conditioning on Country Characteristics
We now present estimates from our complete model allowing for the interaction of
country characteristics with a measure of openness.  We report only interactions with the
trade intensity measure of openness because other candidate measures have either very little
time series variation or were eliminated because of insufficient data.  We report the results
for our second step procedure for finding trade's effect in table 3.   TABLE 3: ISOLATING TRADE’S EFFECT:AS ECOND STEP

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% conﬁ-
dence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. Dependent variable is the log of
the median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site.
TABLE 4: SCALE,C OMPOSITION,T ECHNIQUE,&T RADE ELASTICITIES























































































































































































Note: All elasticities are evaluated at sample means.34
There are several features of note in the table. First, adding the openness interactions has not
undermined  the  model's  basic  predictions  regarding  scale,  technique  and  composition
effects.   In particular, the sign of our basic regressors is maintained and in most cases the
significance levels are enhanced by the inclusion of the openness interactions.  
Second,  the  inclusion  of  country  characteristics  appears  to  have  made  a  large
difference to the impact openness has on pollution.    The coefficient  on  our  measure of
openness is now highly significant whereas in table 2 it was not significant at conventional
levels.  Its magnitude is now approximately ten times its former size.  The interaction terms
with country characteristics are also highly significant.   
Third, the sign pattern of the interaction terms is as expected from theory. The linear
interaction term on openness and (relative) income per capita is positive in both columns and
the quadratic term is always negative.  Consequently if a country has a relatively low level of
income per capita relative to the rest of the world, then – all else equal - the impact of further
openness must be to make this country dirtier.  Relatively rich countries would be made
cleaner with trade.  These results may reflect the ceteris paribus pollution haven hypothesis
where relative income differences alone determine the composition effect of trade.  Similarly,
the linear interaction term on (relative) capital intensity is always negative and the quadratic
term always positive.  Therefore, if a country has a sufficiently high capital to labor ratio
relative to the rest of the world, then the impact of further openness must be to make this
country dirtier.  Capital-scarce countries would be made cleaner with trade.  This sign pattern
may  reflect  the  ceteris  paribus  factor-endowment  hypothesis  where  factor  abundance
differences alone determine the composition effect of trade.    
Together these results indicate that scale, technique and composition effects are still at
work determining pollution concentrations but open economy  considerations  also  matter.
But while the sign and statistical significance of the estimates in table 3 are supportive of our
approach it is important to investigate whether the magnitude of the coefficient estimates are
in some sense plausible. 
Scale, Composition and Technique Elasticities
There are several ways to evaluate these results.  One method is to examine whether
the  implied  elasticity  estimates  for  scale  (GDP/km
2),  technique  (income  per  capita),35
composition (capital to labor ratio), and trade intensity (exports  plus  imports divided by
GDP) lead to implausible conclusions regarding income growth or technological progress.  
In  table  4  below  we  present the elasticities  implied  by  our  estimates  in  table  3.      All
elasticities  are evaluated  at the sample means and  therefore  can be  interpreted  as  those
applying  to  an  “average  country”  in  our  sample.    In  calculating  the  technique  and
composition elasticities we have assumed that our “average” country’s relative position in the
world remains constant when it undergoes either income growth or capital accumulation.  
The results in table 4 are largely supportive of our theory.  The estimated elasticities
are not implausibly high, and all elasticity estimates are significantly different from zero.  
Moreover the signs for the scale, technique and composition elasticities are as predicted by
theory.      To  investigate  the  plausibility  of  these  estimates  further  note  that  neutral
technological progress of 1% would raise GDP and GDP per person by 1%.  Therefore,
neutral technological progress creates a positive scale effect on concentrations, but according
to  our  estimates  this  scale effect  is  more than offset  by  a  negative  technique  effect.27
Therefore  our  estimates  indicate  that  increases  in  economic  activity  driven  by  neutral
technological progress lowers concentrations.  
Alternatively,  if  we  consider  an  increase  in  GDP  fueled  entirely  by  capital
accumulation the picture is far less favorable to the environment.  Our estimates indicate that
a 1% increase in the capital to labor ratio raises concentrations by about 1% all else equal.  
However an increase in the capital to labor ratio will have accompanying impacts on the scale
of economic activity and on real incomes.  If we make a back-of-the-envelope calculation by
taking capital’s share in the value of domestic output at 1/3, then capital accumulation leading
to a 1% increase in the capital to labor ratio creates a 1/3 percentage point increase in GDP
per capita and GDP/km
2.   Applying the estimates from table 4 we find that the induced
technique effect is approximately -.5 and the induced scale effect is perhaps .08.  Adding the
direct composition effect to these estimates suggests that economic growth fueled entirely by
capital accumulation raises pollution concentrations.  
While these two exercises are not tests of our theory, the results are reassuringly
close to what we may have expected ex ante.   More speculatively, these last two thought
                                                
27  In the fixed effects case the point estimate for such an experiment is -1.45 with a 95% confidence
interval of (-2.1, -.76).  The random effects case tells a similar story with a point estimate of -1.36 with a
confidence interval of (-1.78, -.95).36
experiments  may also  provide a  possible  explanation  for  the Kuznets  curve  that  many
authors have found between pollution and per capita income.  If economic growth is driven
primarily  by  capital  accumulation  in  the early stages  of  development, and  primarily  by
technological progress in later years, then our results indicate that pollution concentrations
may at first rise and then fall with increases in income per capita.     
Trade Intensity Elasticity
Next consider the trade intensity elasticity. The trade intensity elasticity measures the
predicted change in concentrations for a 1% change in the ratio of exports plus imports to
GDP.   This measure indicates that a 1% change in the share of trade in GDP should reduce
concentrations by .53% in the random effects model and .86% in the fixed effects model.
These seem rather large in  isolation,  but  the estimates  from  table  3  also  indicate  that
technological progress in abatement technology or changing knowledge and attitudes toward
pollution appear to be driving concentrations down by 3-4% per year.  
Note our trade intensity estimate (evaluated at the mean of our sample) is negative
and significantly different from zero in both formulations.  This is a somewhat surprising
result because it indicates that trade has an overall negative composition effect rather than a
close to zero effect we may have expected. Proposition 1 indicates that the sign of the trade
intensity elasticity should reflect a country’s comparative advantage in  clean  versus  dirty
goods.    Therefore  it  is  not  plausible  that  all  countries  in  the  world  have  a  negative
composition effect. Although we have only a sample of countries it seems reasonable  to
expect both positive and negative elasticities.   
As a check on our theory we calculated each country’s trade elasticity.  We find that
the country specific elasticity estimates are both positive and negative.28  About 1/3 of the
countries have trade elasticities indistinguishable from zero.  We find some positive elasticity
estimates, but the majority of elasticities in our sample are negative and statistically different
from zero.  These findings are roughly consistent with our theory, because our theory only
predicts that there should be a distribution of these elasticities around zero.
                                                
28  See appendix table B.2.FIGURE 1:
Country-speciﬁc Openness Elasticities vs. Relative Income
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Country-speciﬁc Openness Elasticities vs. Relative Capital Abundance
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Note: The elasticities shown in the above diagrams correspond to the random-effects re-
gression presented in table 3, evaluated at corresponding sample means. Countries with
less than ﬁve observations in the data set were excluded from the above diagrams.38
Finally we may ask what country characteristics are tied with a trade elasticity that is
negative or one that is positive.  If the compositional effects of trade were primarily driven
by the simple pollution haven hypothesis we would expect  a  strong  negative  correlation
between relative income and the magnitude of the trade elasticity. In fact as shown in Figure
1, there is no such relationship between the size of a country’s trade elasticity and its relative
income level.  
Similarly, if the compositional effects of trade were primarily driven by the simplest
factor endowment hypothesis  we  would  expect  a  strongly  positive relationship  between
relative capital abundance and the sign of a country’s trade elasticity.   In fact as shown in
Figure  2,  there is  little  apparent  relationship  between the strength of  a  country’s  trade
elasticity and its relative capital abundance.
The explanation for these finding is simple: low-income countries typically have both
low  income  per  capita  and  low  capital  to  labor ratios.  The pollution  haven  hypothesis
suggests  that a  low-income  economy should  be  made dirtier  by  trade,  but  if  pollution
intensive industries are also capital intensive then whatever benefits accrue from lax pollution
regulation could be largely undone by the relatively higher price of capital in this  capital
scarce country.  As a result, further openness to trade will have a very small effect on the
pollution intensity of output for low-income countries.  Similarly,  high-income  countries
have both high income and high capital to labor ratios.  The former argues in favor of trade
lowering the pollution intensity of output, while the latter argues in favor of trade raising it.
It is not that the (ceterus paribus) pollution haven hypothesis is wrong, or that the (ceterus
paribus) factor endowment driven basis for trade  is  absent.    Rather it is  that given the
relationship between income per capita and capital to labor ratios (summarized for example
by the one-sector neoclassical growth model) these two partial theories work against each
other.   Consequently, the potentially very  large composition  effects predicted  by  either
theory turn out to be relatively small in practice.   
4.3 The Last Step: Putting it all Together
We argued previously (in section 2.3) that because we could not quantify the impact
of trade liberalization on either GDP or GDP per person we could not identify the impact of39
trade liberalization on pollution through either the scale or the technique effect.  Our empirical
strategy could at best provide an estimate of the composition effect created by trade.  We
would now like to suggest that this admission of defeat was in fact a strategic retreat from the
question posed in our title - not an outright surrender.  Our estimates in table 4 indicate that a
change in GDP that creates both a scale and technique effect (but leave a country’s  K/L
unchanged)  will  lower  pollution.    One  possible  cause  for  such  a  change  is  neutral
technological progress.  Trade liberalization is another: taking factor endowments as fixed, a
lowering of transport costs or trade barriers raises the value of domestic output and  real
income for a small open economy.  The value of output and the value of income rise by the
same percentage and this creates both scale and technique effects.  
Our estimates indicate that the net effect of this trade-induced increase in output and
income will be a fall in concentrations.  For example, if we use the estimates from the fixed-
effects regression from table 4, the scale elasticity for an average country is .193 while the
technique elasticity is –1.611.  Taken together, they imply a net effect of -1.418 with a 95%
confidence interval of (-2.110, -0.726).  The composition effect of trade for our average
country is also negative.  It is apparent then that for an average country in our sample, the
full  impact  of  further  openness  to  international  trade  -  through  scale,  technique  and
composition effects - will be a reduction in SO2 concentrations!
How large a reduction any one country reaps from a reduction in trade frictions will
of course depend on country characteristics, the impact further trade has on domestic income
and output, and how the ongoing process of globalization is affecting country characteristics
elsewhere in the  world.    Since countries will differ somewhat in  their particular  scale,
technique and trade intensity elasticities, some may indeed be made dirtier from a reduction
in trade frictions, but we expect that trade’s effect – whether positive or negative – will be
small.  After all the estimated impact of even a large trade liberalization on GDP is small, and
when this small increase in GDP is then filtered through our estimated scale and technique
elasticities the net effect is likely to be smaller still.  While in theory, trade’s impact on the
pollution intensity of output can be large, in practice our estimates suggest a much more
muted response.     
These conclusions rely  however  on  our  assumption that factor endowments and
technology remain fixed when trade frictions fall.  If further trade spurs capital accumulation
or  if  trade brings  knowledge  spillovers  and  hastens  technological  progress  then  other40
calculations must come into play.  Whether these trade-induced changes bring about a net
improvement in the environment will depend quite delicately on their estimated size since our
estimates indicate that they have opposing effects on pollution concentrations.  There is a
burgeoning empirical literature linking openness to growth and technology adoption and we
have nothing new to add here. But clearly our estimates together with input from these other
sources might provide another method for assessing trade’s full impact.  
While the balance of our evidence suggests that freer trade is more likely to be good
rather than bad for the environment, this conclusion is subject to several provisos.  Our work
has several strong maintained assumptions that may be false.    As  well,  our  data is  not
perfect, and it is important to emphasize that the pollutant we study - sulfur dioxide - is but
one of many pollutants that may be affected by trade. Clearly much more work could and
should be done along these lines. And while we are reasonably confident in our analysis
some readers may want further analysis.  In order to meet these demands we present a series
of sensitivity tests in Appendix B.  In this appendix we investigate whether our findings are
robust  to:  changes  in  the  dependent  variable  (mean,  median,  95%,  etc.);  other
transformations of the dependent variable (Box-Cox, linear); the inclusion of unrestricted
time dummies; the inclusion of resource endowments and the real price of energy; changes in
the time period of the analysis; and changes in the estimation procedure to allow for the
simultaneous determination  of  both  income  and  pollution  levels.    Overall  the results  in
Appendix B are surprisingly similar to those presented in the text.  The main features of our
analysis remain intact: the technique effect remains surprisingly strong in relation to the scale
effect, and our trade intensity interactions retain their sign and significance levels.   
    
5. Conclusion
This  paper sets  out  a  theory  of  how  openness  to  trading  opportunities  affects
pollution concentrations.  We started with a theoretical specification that gave pride of place
to  scale,  technique  and  composition  effects  and  then  showed  how  this  theoretical
decomposition is useful in thinking about the relationship between openness to international
markets and the environment.  In our empirical section we adopted a specification directly
linked to our earlier theory.  We then estimated this specification paying special attention to41
the potentially confounding influences introduced by the panel structure of our data set.  Our
results  consistently  indicate  that  scale,  technique  and  composition  effects  are  not  just
theoretical constructs with no empirical counterparts.  Rather these theoretical constructs can
be identified and their magnitude measured.  Moreover,  once measured they can play a
useful role in determining the likely environmental consequences of technological progress,
capital accumulation or increased trade. These estimates may also be  useful  in  aggregate
CGE modeling of the effects of various free trade agreements and other trade reforms [see
for example, Ferrantino et al.,1996].
Overall the results indicate that increases in  a  country’s  exposure  to  international
markets creates small but measurable changes in  pollution  concentrations  by  altering  the
pollution intensity of national output. While our estimates indicate that greater trade intensity
creates only relatively small changes in pollution via the composition effect, economic theory
and numerous empirical studies demonstrate that trade also raises the value of national output
and income.  These associated increases in output and incomes will then impact on pollution
concentrations via our estimated scale and technique effects.   Our estimates of the scale and
technique elasticities indicate that if openness to international markets raises both output and
income by 1%, pollution concentrations fall by approximately 1%.  Putting this calculation
together with  our  earlier  evidence  on  composition  effects yields a  somewhat surprising
conclusion: freer trade is good for the environment.     42
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Description of The Data Set
A.1 The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our study is the concentration of sulphur dioxide at observation sites in
major cities around the world as obtained through the GEMS/AIR data set supplied by the World
Health Organization. Measurements are carried out using comparable methods. Each observation
station reports annual summary statistics of SO
2 concentrations such as the median, the arithmetic
and geometricmean, as well as 90th and 95th percentiles. The rawdatasupplied by theWHOwere
processed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and are disseminated to
the public through the EPA’s web site. We have obtained a more comprehensive version of what is
released directly from the EPA.
We have chosen to use a logarithmic transformation of the median SO
2 concentration as our
dependent variable. Figure A.1 shows that the distribution of concentrations is highly-skewed to-
wards zero when viewed on a linear scale. In this diagram, the horizontal axis shows ranges of
median SO
2 concentrations in parts per million per cubic metre [ppm/m3]. As was pointed out in
the WHO (1984) report about the GEMS/AIR project, concentrations are more suitably described
by alog-normaldistribution. Thisisapparentin ﬁgureA.2 wherethehorizontalaxisislogarithmic.
The large number of observations in the bin at the very left of the diagram can be explained by the
measurement threshold of the measurement devices; they cannot measure arbitrarily low concen-
trations. There is also an ambient level of SO
2 in the air that has natural causes.
The composition of the data set by contributor countries is shown in the pie diagram of ﬁg-
ure A.3. A large share of observations were from the United States, due to this country’s extensive
networkofairqualitymeasurementstations. OtherlargecontributorcountrieswereChina,Canada,
andJapan. Allinall,ouranalysisisbased onover2,600 observationsfrom293observationstations
in 109 cities around the world; these cities are located in 44 countries. Figure A.4 reveals the time
period during which individual countries participated in the GEMS/AIR project. The countries are
ranked by length of participation. Numerous countries provide more than ﬁfteen years of observa-
tions, among them the United States, Canada, Germany, and Japan. In addition, table A.1 lists the
cities in which the observation stations were located along with the number of stations in each city
and the minimum and maximum concentrations measured at any of the stations in a given city.
A.2 Data Sets
The data set was constructed from a variety of sources that are described in detail below and are
summarized in the following diagram:
GEMS/AIR The primary source for our data is the AIRS Executive International database that
contains information about ambient air pollution in nations that voluntarily pro-
vide data to the GEMS/AIR Programme sponsored by the United Nations World


































































Figure A.2: Distribution of the Dependent Variable (logarithmic scale)
SO2 Concentration Distribution


























































A-2Figure A.3: Composition of GEMS/Air Data Set
(Number of Observations per Country)

























A-3Figure A.4: GEMS/Air Participation by Country and Time Period
(Countries are sorted by decreasing number of contributing years)
GEMS/Air Participation by Country and Year
Year













































A-4Table A.1: Cities by descending maximum of annual median SO
2 concentration
Country & City n min max Country& City n min max Country & City n min max
KOR Seoul 6 25 115 CHE Zurich 1 17 26 USA Long Beach, CA 1 1 10
ITA Rome 3 2 103 IRL Dublin 3 4 26 USA Seattle, WA 1 1 10
ITA Milan 2 17 100 MYS Kuala Lumpur 4 1 25 NZL Auckland 3 1 9
YUG Zagreb 3 5 98 USA Alexandria, VA 1 5 25 IRQ Baghdad 3 1 8
IRN Tehran 3 7 93 POL Wroclaw 3 6 24 USA Chelsea, MA 1 4 8
CHN Shenyang 4 1 89 COL Medellin 3 1 22 USA Tampa, FL 3 1 8
AUT Vienna 3 40 80 ISR Tel Aviv 5 1 22 COL Cali 3 1 7
ESP Madrid 5 2 73 HKG Hong Kong 6 1 21 GHA Accra 3 4 6
CSK Prague 3 13 65 CAN Hamilton 5 1 20 THA Bangkok 4 1 6
BEL Brussels 4 9 64 CAN Montreal 4 1 20 USA Allen Park, MI 1 2 6
EGY Cairo 4 1 61 SWE Stockholm 5 1 20 USA St Ann, MO 1 4 6
GBR London 3 11 58 USA Philadelphia, PA 5 1 20 USA River Rouge, MI 1 3 6
JPN Tokyo 3 5 58 USA St Louis, MO 3 3 20 DEU Munich 1 5 5
JPN Osaka 4 5 56 CAN Vancouver 7 1 19 IDN Jakarta 3 1 5
CHN Guangzhou 4 2 55 PAK Lahore 2 15 19 PER Lima 3 1 5
BRA Sao Paulo 5 8 51 DNK Copenhagen 3 3 18 USA Atlanta, GA 2 2 5
PHL Manila 3 2 50 USA Detroit,MI 2 2 18 USA Waltham, MA 1 1 5
CHL Santiago 3 11 49 KEN Nairobi 2 7 17 PHL Davao 2 1 4
BRA Rio De Janeiro 2 20 46 USA Chester, PA 1 6 17 ARG Buenos Aires 1 1 3
CHN Beijing 5 1 44 NZL Christchurch 4 1 16 ARG San Lorenzo 1 2 3
CHN Xian 4 3 41 FRA Paris 3 2 15 USA Chula Vista, CA 1 1 3
CHN Shanghai 4 1 40 SWE Oxelosund 1 11 15 USA Dallas, TX 1 2 3
USA Boston, MA 2 3 40 USA Washington, DC 2 7 15 USA Livonia, MI 1 1 3
DEU Frankfurt 3 5 38 USA Cicero, IL 1 2 14 USA St Petersburg, FL 1 1 3
FRA Toulouse 4 19 38 VEN Caracas 3 3 14 USA Adams Co, CO 1 1 3
NLD Amsterdam 3 6 37 SWE Nykoping 2 5 13 USA Burbank, CA 1 1 2
IND Bombay 6 3 36 USA Chicago, IL 3 1 13 USA Los Angeles, CA 1 1 2
COL Bogota 3 1 35 USA East St Louis, IL 1 5 13 USA San Diego, CA 1 1 2
PRT Lisbon 3 1 35 POL Warsaw 3 3 12 USA Tarpon Springs, FL 1 1 2
IND Calcutta 3 4 33 USA Camden, NJ 1 5 11 ARG Cordoba 2 1 1
GBR Glasgow 3 11 32 USA Wood River, IL 1 2 11 ARG San Miguel de Tucuman 7 1 1
ARG Mendoza 3 10 30 CAN Toronto 5 1 10 ARG Santa Fe 1 1 1
AUS Melbourne 1 1 30 FIN Helsinki 3 1 10 ISR Ashdod 2 1 1
IND New Delhi 3 1 30 USA Baytown, TX 1 1 10 USA Azusa, CA 1 1 1
GRC Athens 5 7 29 USA Blue Island, IL 1 1 10 USA El Cajon, CA 1 1 1
USA New York City,NY 2 7 28 USA Denver, CO 1 2 10
AUS Sydney 3 2 27 USA Houston, TX 3 1 10
Note: The column
n is the number of observation stations in each city. The columns min and max show the
lowest and highest measured level of the annual median SO
2 concentration in each city, measured in parts per
billion. Note that a maximum or minimum concentration of “1” is equivalent to the measurement threshold of
the measurement device. Countriesappear with their ISO-3166 codes.
A-5Health Organization. This package is provided by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (US-EPA) at http://www.epa.gov/airs/aexec.html. The US-EPA kindly
provided a much more complete version of this dataset that included not only aver-
ages but also median and other percentiles of SO
2 concentrations. We would like
to express our gratitude to Jonathan Miller of the US-EPA for providing additional
GEMS/Air data not contained in thepublic release of thedatabase, and for patiently
answering our numerous technical questions. We had problems with the identiﬁca-
tionofseveralobservationstations. Thelongitudeandlatitudeinformationprovided
in one of the ancillary ﬁles was in some cases incorrect and was corrected case-by-
case based on the the description of the location.
PWT The Penn World Tables are described in Robert Summers and Alan Heston, “The
Penn WorldTable (Mark5): An Expanded Set of InternationalComparisons, 1950–
1988”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, May 1991, pp. 327–368. Vari-
ables obtained from this data set include GDP per capita, population, capital stock
per worker, and trade intensity. Note that the PWT do not contain data for Cuba;
thus, this country was dropped from our analysis. The PWT data are available in
revision 5.6 from the NBER ftp site at ftp://ftp.nber.org/pwt56/.
CIESIN The Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)
Global Population Distribution Database contains the total population contained





￿ in the year 1990 for each country. This data set is
only available for this single year. It can be obtained freely from the United Na-
tions Environmental Programme server maintained by the U.S. Geological Survey
at http://grid2.cr.usgs.gov/globalpop/1-degree/description.html.
The CIESIN data set was augmented by population counts of major urban agglom-
erations that is produced by the United Nations Population Division’s 1996 Global
Population Estimates and Projections database on Urban Agglomerations 1950–
2015.1 Additional data was obtained from the U.N. Demographic Yearbook (1994)
and the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994) to ﬁll gaps in the data set.
WRI The World Resources Institute publishes data on natural resources and physical
endowments of countries. Data are published in “World Resources 1994-1995: A
Guide to the Global Environment”, Oxford University Press, Oxford:1995, and the
subsequent “World Resources 1996-98” edition of this report. The WRI publishes
the full set of data on diskette. Information is available at http://www.wri.org/.
SACHS/WARNER The source for this data set is the NBER working paper by Jeoffrey Sachs and
Andrew Warner acknowledged in the bibliogrpahy.
BARRO/LEE The data set contains variables from the 1994 cross-country study by Robert J.
Barro and Jong-Wha Lee. Data are presented either quinquennially for the years
1960-1985, i.e., 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985, or for averages of ﬁve
years’ sub-periods over 1960-1985. This dataset is available from the NBER web
1The Director, PopulationDivision/DESIPA, United Nations, DC2-1950, New York, NY 10017, US
A-6site as a zip-ped archive at http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/ZIP/BARLEE.ZIP;
for more information, read http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/README.TXT.
GHCN Weather data was provided by the Global Historical Climatology Network.I n -
formationis available on monthly average temperatures, monthly precipitation,and
atmospheric pressure. The ﬁrst GHCN data base contains mean monthly tempera-
ture data (in tenths of degrees celsius) for 6039 stations throughout the world. The
second GHCN data base contains total monthly precipitation data (in tenths of mil-
limeters) for 7533 stations throughout the world. Most records (76%) end in the
1980s. No data are available for any station after 1990. To make the data usable for
our project, the atmospheric pollution measurement stations were matched to their
closest meteorologicalobservationstations. Wheretwostations werenearby,an av-
erageof thesetwowereformed. Therawdataand descriptionﬁleareavailablefrom
the National Climatic Data Center of the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration at ftp://ftp.ncdc.noaa.gov/pub/data/ghcn/v1/.
IMF/IFS The InternationalMonetary Fund’s “InternationalFinancial Statistics” providedan-
cillary data, mostly growth rates of real GDP and population, that were used to ex-
trapolate data from the Penn World Tables.
OIL Real world oil prices were obtained from the U.S. Energy InformationAdministra-
tion, a branch of the U.S. Dept. of Energy. The real world oil price is calculated by
dividing the landed costs of crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia (Arabian Light) in
US$ per barrel by the US GDP deﬂator (1990=100). More information is available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/price.html.
A/C/T Longitudeand Latitudedata forthe participatingcities inthe GEMS/Air studywere
hand-coded by the authors and were obtained primarily from the index of “Oxford
Concise Atlas of the World”, 2nd edition, Reed International Books, London, 1995.
A.3 Regressors
The followinglist ofvariablesexplainsthecontent, method ofconstruction, any modiﬁcations,and
source of each of them.
GDP KM This measure is an approximation of the economic intensity of a city relative to its
size ($/km
2). It is obtained by multiplying a country’s per-capita GDP ($/person)
by each city’s population density (people/km
2). Extrapolations for per-capita GDP
were carried out for the years past 1993 based on real growth rates obtained from
the IMF/IFS statistics. Population densities were available only for 1990.
Physical Unit: millions of 1995 US dollars per square kilometre.
Dimensions: city by year.
Sources: PWT, CIESIN.
KL This is the capital abundance obtained from the physical capital stock per worker
variable in the Penn World Tables.
Physical Unit: thousands of 1995 US dollars.
A-7Dimensions: country by year.
Source: PWT.
RKL Relative capital abundance isvariableKL divided by thecorresponding world aver-
age for the given year, where “world average” is deﬁned by all the countries in the
Penn World Tables.
Physical Unit: index number, world average equal to 1.0
Dimensions: country by year.
Source: PWT.
























Physical Unit: thousands of 1995 US dollars.
Dimensions: country by year.
Source: PWT.
RI Relative income is variable I divided by the corresponding world average for the
given year, where “world average” is deﬁned by all the countries in the Penn World
Tables.
Physical Unit: index number, world average equal to 1.0
Dimensions: country by year.
Source: PWT.
SUB, RUR Suburbanandrurallocation typedummyvariables. The third(default)locationtype
is central city. Note that GEMS/Air measurement stations are not all directly in
metropolitanareas. IntheGEMS/Airdatasetsuburbanandruralareasareonlyiden-
tiﬁed in the United States and China, comprising about 14% and 3% of all observa-
tions, respectively.
Physical Unit: binary variable
Dimension: observation site by year
Source: GEMS/AIR.
TI A country’s trade intensity is deﬁned as the sum of exports and imports expressed
as a percentage of gross domestic product.
Physical Unit: percent
Dimensions: country by year
Source: PWT.
BMP Black Market Premium of foreign exchange rate. Data are available for 1970 and
1980. Data for other years is interpolated linearly and extraploated by projecting
the end-points ﬂatly.
Physical Unit: percent
Dimensions: country by year
Source: Barro-Lee (as obtained from issues of the World Currency Yearbook2)
2InternationalCurrency Data, Inc., 328 Flatbush Avenue, Suite 344, Brooklyn,NY 11238, U.S.A.
A-8TARIFF Averagetariffrateonimportsofintermediategoodsandcapitalgoods. Thismeasure
is an average for the time period 1985-88.
Physical Unit: percent
Dimensions: country
Source: Sachs/Warner (originally: Barro/Lee (1994))
QUOTA Coverage of quotas on imports of intermediates and capital goods. It is the own-
import weighted nontariff frequency on capital goods and intermediates, based on




Source: Sachs/Warner (originally: Barro/Lee (1994))
SW Sachs/Warner measure of openness. This measure is available for the entire time-
period of our sample. This dummy variable is 1 for open economies and 0 if either
of the following is true: (a) the country has a black market premium over 20%; (b)
it is a socialist country as classiﬁed by Kornai (1992, table 1.1); (c) it had a score of
4 on the export marketing index in the World Bank study by Husain and Faruquee
(1994, p. 238), or the QUOTA variable was greater than 0.4.
Physical Unit: binary variable
Dimensions: country by year
Source: Sachs/Warner
WT Average annual temperature.
Physical Unit: degrees Celsius
Dimensions: country by year
Source: GHCN
WP Coefﬁcient of variation of monthly precipitation. This is calculated as the standard
deviation of monthly precipitation in a given year divided by the monthly precipita-
tion average in that given year.
Physical Unit: dimensionless number
Dimensions: country by year
Source: GHCN
OIL The real price of oil. Physical Unit: 1990-$ per barrel
Dimensions: year
Source: U.S. Department of Energy.
HCOAL Hard coal reserves abundance.
Physical Unit: PetaJoules per million workers
Dimensions: country by year
Source: WRI
SCOAL Soft coal reserves abundance.
Physical Unit: PetaJoules per million workers
A-9Dimensions: country by year
Source: WRI
C.C. Communist Country Dummy. This variable is equal to one if the country is either
China, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Yugoslavia.
Physical Unit: binary variable
Dimensions: country (for our sample there is no time variation)
Source: A/C/T.
TIME Years elapsed since 1980.
Summary statistics for the major variables appear in table A.2.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Dimension Obs. Mean Std.Dev.
Log of SO2 log(ppm) 2621 -2.102 0.480
City Economic Intensity $m per km
2 2621 7.729 8.733
Capital abundance $k 2621 31.496 17.775
GDP per capita, 3yr avg. $k 2621 14.114 8.372
Trade Intensity % 2621 41.054 31.859






) World=1.00 2621 2.224 1.198
Communist Country [—] 2621 0.147 0.354
C.C.
￿ Income $k 385 3.669 2.403
Population Density 1000p/km
2 2621 0.615 0.549
Avg. Temperature
￿C 2621 14.602 5.556
Precipitation Coeff. of Var. [—] 2621 0.011 0.006
Note: All monetary ﬁgures are in 1995 US Dollars. The interaction term for income
with the communist countries dummy only shows the case where the the dummy is
equal toone; thus themean forthisline isthe mean for the communist countriesonly.
Populationdensity is for each city in the year 1990.
A-10Appendix B
Detailed Results
B.1 Capital Intensity and Pollution Abatement
Figure B.1 illustrates the relationship between capital intensity and the pollution abatement costs
per unit of output ratio. A regression through the 122 data pointsbased on thelogarithmictransfor-
mations of abatement cost ratio and capital intensity reveals a positive relationship with an
R
2 of
0.3, indicatingthat a1%increase inthecapital intensity increasestheabatement cost ratioby 0.7%.
Data were only available for manufacturing industries. Thus, a particularly interesting industry—
electricity generation—isnot included in the sample. Fromother sources it is known that pollution
abatement costs and capital intensity are both extremely high in that industry.
B.2 More Results
Table B.1 reports the full set of estimates that corresponds to each of the regressions shown in ab-
breviated form in table 2.
B.3 Elasticities
Elasticities are calculated using the Delta method1 for functions of the least squares estimator. Ta-
bleB.2 presentsestimatedelasticitiesandtheircorrespondingestimatedstandarderrorsforthetrade
intensity effect. The elasticities in table B.2 were evaluated at the sample mean (based on the 2621
observations in our sample), and two 10-year averages of trade intensity, relative income and rela-
tivecapital abundance based on the periods1975-84 and 1985-94. Table B.2 shows these elasticity
calculations corresponding to the ﬁxed-effects and random effects regression estimates shown in
table 3.
1See William H. Greene, “Econometric Analysis”, thirdedition, Prentice-Hall: 1997, section 6.7.5, pp. 278ff.
B-1Figure B.1: Pollution Abatement and Capital Intensity in the U.S. (1988)
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cationsforMexico’sExports”, chapter7in: PatrickLow (ed.) “InternationalTradeandtheEnvironment”,WorldBank
Discussion paper 159, The WorldBank, Washington/DC,1992, pp. 113-114. Additionalcapital and labour ﬁgures for
the 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries were taken from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturing. The i123-type
labels next to each data point indicate the 3-digit US-SIC industry.
B-2Table B.1: Full Regression Results for Table 2



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% conﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. Dependent variable is the log of the median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site. Note that
the black market premium, average tariff and quota coverage variables measure theinverse of openness; their sign has
thus to be reversed to interpret the direction of the estimates as an increase in openness.
B-3Table B.2: Country-Speciﬁc Elasticities from Baseline Regression
Fixed Effects Random Effects





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿, respectively. Countries appear with their ISO-3166 codes.
B-4Appendix C
Sensitivity Analysis
We have subjected our model to a large array of sensitivity analyses. Section C.1 considers vari-
ousalternativesof our “baseline”model withrespect totheregressorsandpropertiesofthesample.
Haveweleftourimportantvariables? Isourmodelsensitivetothechosentimeperiod? SectionC.2
continues with a closer look at our dependent variable SO
2 concentration. What happens if we use





Results presented in the main part of this paper are based on a regression model shown in table 3,
hereafter referredto as the “baseline” model. To analyze the sensitivity of these results, we modify
the right-hand side of our estimating equation to address potential problems and to introduce addi-
tional regressors. The results for four additional types of models are shown in tables C.1 and C.2
for ﬁxed-effects and random-effects estimators, respectively.
The GEMS/Air study was carried out primarily throughout the years 1976-1991 when the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) provided funding to the participating countries.
Before 1976 there are only few countries that provide measurements of SO
2 concentrations, and
after 1991, the number of countries that report such observations drop rapidly. This is shown in
table A.4. By 1996 data are only available from the United States. To allow for a possible par-
ticipation bias due to funding, we repeat our baseline regression by excluding observations from
before 1976 and from after 1991. This procedure reduces the number of observations by roughly
500, or 20%. None of the parameters that desribe scale, composition, technique, and openness ef-
fect change sign or signiﬁcance except for the scale variable. In the ﬁxed-effect model, the signif-
icance of the weather variables changes. We now ﬁnd that a higher concentration of precipitation
leads to higher pollution levels. This is consistent with our a-priori expectation that more frequent
rain washes SO
2 out of the air.
A possible objection for using data from communist countries is that (a) they are not following
a market mechanism and thus will not respond properly to changes in relative prices; and (b) con-
sumers cannot induce the government to tighten pollution regulation. In the latter case, we would
notﬁndatechniqueeffect. Wealreadyallowedforthispossibilitybyisolatingacommunist-country
technique effect. It turned out that we cannot identify a technique effect for these countries that is
signiﬁcantly different from zero. To address the unresponsiveness to market signals and allowing
forastructuraldifferencebetweencommunistand free-marketcountries, wedeleteallobservations
from communist countries and re-run our baseline regression. This procedure, which reduces the
number of observations by roughly 15%, has only a marginal impact on our estimates.
C-1Table C.1: Sensitivity Analysis for Speciﬁcation — Fixed Effects






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: To conserve space, no standard errors or t-statisticsare shown. However, signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% con-
ﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the median of SO
2 concen-
trations at each observation site. Models are: Base = base regression from table 3; Time = time period is shortened to
the main UNEP supportperiod 1976-91for the GEMS/Air project; no C.C. = communist countries are excluded; Res.
= resource variables (hard coal, soft coal) and oil price are added; Yr-Dum = year dummies are entered instead of a
linear time trend, but are not shown individually.
C-2Table C.2: Sensitivity Analysis for Speciﬁcation — Random Effects


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: To conserve space, no standard errors or t-statisticsare shown. However, signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% con-
ﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of the median of SO
2 concen-
trations at each observation site. Models are: Base = base regression from table 3; 76-91 = time period is shortened to
the main UNEP supportperiod 1976-91for the GEMS/Air project; no C.C. = communist countries are excluded; Res.
= resource variables (hard coal, soft coal) and oil price are added; Yr-Dum = year dummies are entered instead of a
linear time trend, but are not shown individually.
C-3In a further step, we introduce three new variables into our baseline model. Noting that there
is typically a strong homebias in fuel consumption, we suspect that countries endowed abundantly
with eitherhard coal orsoft coal willrely to alargerextent on thesefuel types. Reasons forastrong
home bias could be (a) very high transportation costs; (b) substantial import barriers; or (c) local
subsidization, directly or indirectly. Typically, soft coal contains a larger amount of sulphur than
hard coal, but we expect a relative abundance of either soft or hard coal to increase the level of
SO
2. To express relative abundance of these endowments (in a Heckscher-Ohlin sense), we divide
theabsolutelevelofendowment bythesizeof theworkforceineach country. In therandom-effects
model weﬁnd asmall (albeit insigniﬁcant)positiveeffect ofsoft coal abundance on pollutionand a
small negative effect of hard coal abundance on pollution. No clear results emerge from the ﬁxed-
effects model.
Anothervariableweintroduceistherealpriceofoil. Ahigherpriceofoil shouldreducetheuse
of (sulphur-containing)oil. In fact, we can identify such a relationship in both theﬁxed-effectsand
random-effectsmodel. However, on theoretical groundstheeffect of a higher oil priceon pollution
is not necessarily as straight-forward as the above argument implies. If a higher oil price leads to
a substitution effect and a switching from oil to other fuel types, it is uncertain if this other fuel is
“cleaner” natural gas or “dirtier” coal. The data seem to suggest that the substitution is towards
cleaner fuel types.
In another sensitivity test we replace the linear time trend by year dummies. Since we have an
intercept in the model, we do not include dummies for the ﬁrst two years (as there were very few
observationsfortheveryﬁrstyear1971). Theresultissurprisinglysupportiveofalineartimetrend.
The estimates for the year dummies (not shown in tables C.1 and C.2 in order to conserve space)
trace out a remarkably stable linear path.
C.2 Dependent Variable
In a second set of sensitivity analyses we explore the choice of our dependent variable. We have
arguedbefore—basedontheobservationsexpressed inﬁguresA.1 and A.2 thatalogarithmictrans-
formationof the dependent variableis appropriate. However, there is a menu of different SO
2 con-
centrations to choose from. We opted for the median SO
2 concentration because is more “robust”
with respect to outlier observations than the arithmetic mean. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency kindly supplied us with a variety of concentration statistics. We explore all of them in ta-
bles C.3 and C.4 for our ﬁxed-effects and random-effects baseline model. In addition to the me-
dian (“Base”), weuse thearithmeticmean (“Mean”) and the90th, 95th, and 99thpercentileof SO
2
concentrations (“P90%”, “P95%”, and “P99%”). All of these measures were transfomred into log-
arithms when they were used as a dependent variable.
The ﬁrst observation is that the intercept term is increasing from left to right, as the higher per-
centiles have higher average SO
2 concentrations. Comparing the mean with the median, we ﬁnd a
higher intercept forthe mean. One way of reading this is that, adjusted forour regressors, themean
exceeds themedian. This appearstobesimply aresultof thenon-normaldistributionof the(linear)
SO
2 cocentrations, which we saw in ﬁgure A.1 to be highly-skewed to the left.
Allﬁvespeciﬁcationsproduceresultsgenerateresultstharearebroadlyinlinewithourprevious
ﬁndings. In particular, all signs remain the same, the estimates remain signiﬁcant, and the overall
magnitudes change only to a small extent. We take these results as a conﬁrmation of the regularity
C-4Table C.3: Sensitivity Analysis for Dependent Variable — Fixed Effects





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: To conserve space, no standard errors or t-statisticsare shown. However, signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% con-
ﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. The dependent variable is as speciﬁed in the Model line: Base
= the log of the median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site; Mean = the log of the arithmetic mean of SO
2
concentrations; P90%, P95%, P99% = the log of the 90th,95th, and 99th percentiles of SO
2 concentrations.
C-5Table C.4: Sensitivity Analysis for Dependent Variable — Random Effects











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: To conserve space, no standard errors or t-statisticsare shown. However, signiﬁcance at the 95% and 99% con-
ﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. The dependent variable is as speciﬁed in the Model line: Base
= the log of the median of SO
2 concentrations at each observation site; Mean = the log of the arithmetic mean of SO
2
concentrations; P90%, P95%, P99% = the log of the 90th,95th, and 99th percentiles of SO
2 concentrations.
C-6of the distributionof SO
2 concentrations. Recall that these numbers are annual summary statistics
that tend to mitigate the effect from single-day outliers.
We have argued earlier that the appropriate transformation of the dependent variable is to take
thelogarithm,based on ourobservationsexpressed in ﬁgureA.2. However,in tableC.5 we explore
thepossibilityofothertransformations,notably,alineartransformationandaBox-Coxtransforma-
tion. All of these are based on our ﬁxed-effects model.
We apply a Box-Cox transformation as a generalization to our ﬁxed-effects model (where
￿
i is
































































which assumes that there exists a










). The transformation parameter


































































































), that allow us to test the Box-Cox trans-
formation against the log-linear (our baseline) model and the simple linear model.
We ﬁnd that the signs of our estimates remain stable and signiﬁcant. The optimal Box-Cox
transformation parameter is approximately 0.2. When we test this speciﬁcation against either the
log-linear or pure-linear case, the log-likelihood test statistics reject both the log-linear and pure-
linearspeciﬁcationsinfavouroftheBox-Cox transformation. Observe, though,thatthepure-linear
model is rejected by a much larger margin than the log-linear model. Also note that the interpreta-
tion of the parameters changes and cannot be compared across the three models.
C.3 Simultaneity
Yet another concern in our work has been the possibility of a simultaneous determination of pollu-
tion and (current-period)per-capitaincome. We did not pursue a simultaneous-equationsapproach
for our main analysis because it is our belief that the likely effect of pollution on per-capitaincome
is rather small. This belief appears to be validated by Dean (1998), who ﬁnds no signiﬁcant re-
lationship in her 2SLS procedures. Contemporaneous per-capita income only enters through our
scale variable but not through our technique variable; recall that we use lagged per-capita income
to determinethe techniqueeffect because income increases will typically take a number of years to
translate into policy changes.
To address thesimultaneityof income (
y)and pollution(
z) determinationin our scale effect we
have experimentedwitha ﬁxed-effects2-stage least squares estimator usingas asecond estimating













































C-7Table C.5: Sensitivity Analysis for Dependent Variable Transformation




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: To conserve space, no standard errors or t-statisticsare shown. However, signif-




￿ is the transformation parameter of the Box-Cox transformation as deﬁned in equa-





compose a city’s economic intensity measure into the product of per-capitaincome and population
density. Taking logs of the resulting expression, we can additivelyseparate these two effects in our
regression equation. As our measure of population density is constant over time, it does not appear
as a regressor in the ﬁxed-effects implementation. In contrast to our baseline model, the estimated
coefﬁcient corresponding to income is a constant-elasticity estimation of the scale effect.
Results fromthe ﬁxed-effects2SLS regression, shown in tableC.6, indicatethat theparameters
in our baseline model remain stable. However, we estimate the scale effect from a city’s economic
intensity to be much higher than in our baseline model: around 2. In the GDP regression we ﬁnd
that pollution has a negligible (negative) effect on per-capita income with an estimated elasticity
of 0.03, ie, a 10% increase in pollution will decrease per-capita income by 0.3%. The elasticities
for the composition and trade intensity effects (as usual evaluated at sample means) are consistent
with our other work. The technique-effect elasticity is much higher in magnitude (around –3.2).
Consistent with our other empirical work the sum of scale and technique effect remains negative.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Signiﬁcance at
the 95% and 99% conﬁdence levels are indicated by
￿ and
￿
￿, respectively. Regression isa ﬁxed-effects modiﬁcation of
2SLS (ie, site averages have been subtracted).
C-9